"Deaths not halting success" - PM

[Whynniard]

We were discussing the reasons for this War in another thread, so i thought we should start a fresh one.

Is it a war ? according to Britain's Chief of Defence Staff, Sir Jock Stirrup it's the following;

"The mission in Afghanistan is about supporting the delivery of governance in order to reduce the opportunities for extremist terrorist groups who are a direct threat to the United Kingdom, its citizens and their interests,"

It seems to me that there are too many political issues swirling around the troops who are out there; they have had 7years to plan this now and armoured vehicles and helicopters are only just on there way ? It seems they are trying to keep it, the mission, low profile, that they do not want to get drawn in like the Russians. As far as I can see they have only pushed the problem into Pakistan. The Taliban just seem to have longer to walk now.

[Santerme]

Jock Stirrup was, against all convention, given a second term as CDS because he is a Govt mouthpiece in my own humble opinion.

Dissent cannot be tolerated in the MOD.

This piece by Richard Holmes I think hits the real spot.

From The Times July 7, 2009

Rupert should not have died for this

If we can?t develop a coherent Afghanistan strategy, we should not be risking our soldiers? lives

I have worked at officer-training establishments most of my life, and it is characteristic of my profession that casualty lists chart the fate of my friends. Lieutenant-Colonel Rupert Thorneloe, who was flown home yesterday, would not have wished me to suggest that he was more noteworthy than any others killed in Afghanistan, like Trooper Josh Hammond of the Royal Tank Regiment, who died with him. But I taught Rupert on a year-long master?s course, and remember how, in his understated, guardee way, he was a brilliant natural soldier, and a kind and generous man with a rich sense of humour. It is never wise to predict any officer?s ascent of the hierarchy?s greasy pole, but he was my tip for the top.

I write not simply to mourn a friend, but to use his death to illuminate the war ? for such it is, however much we may wish to ignore it. We have been so preoccupied with other issues that it is easy to forget that our commitment to Afghanistan has rumbled on since 2001. It has lasted longer than the Second World War. There are currently about 8,000 British troops there, a steady stream of casualties, and every prospect ? for this is an obdurate struggle against tough opponents ? that the stream will roll on. I discern little evidence of public approval of the war. As Help for Heroes has demonstrated, there is abundant support for the men and women fighting it, and the mismatch worries me, for we may easily persuade ourselves that the best way of helping our heroes is to keep them out of harm?s way.

David Miliband recently affirmed: ?What we are doing in Afghanistan is incredibly important. For the next three to five years it will dominate our foreign policy. It will be the defining issue for the next government.? Yet seldom has something so important actually been so poorly explained. Do we simply seek to keep the Taleban out, or to change the way that Afghanistan is ruled and to improve the lot of its people? Where do we stand over the poppy crop, women?s rights and governmental corruption? And are our aims achievable?

We need a real strategy, not a sequence of tactical ploys; winning battles will not necessarily win the war. Confident assertions that the ?comprehensive approach?, a key plank of our doctrine (notable for its absence from Iraq), is in place must be matched by visible and accurate application of both money and talent, much of the latter by definition non-military.

A whole generation of Rupert Thorneloes, our bright and experienced middle-rank officers, is deeply uneasy. A recent British Army Review article uses the common analogy of mowing the lawn, going out time and time again to do much the same thing. It lambasts gobbledegook such as ?strategy of delivering civil effect?, and laments the stultifying prevalence of ?elf ?n? safety?: a sign warns its author to Take Extra Care When Using Stairways. An article by a recently retired major in June?s Journal of the Royal United Services Institute observes that the US Army has undergone a radical transformation as a result of early failures in Iraq, and the British Army has not.

It is tempting for some senior officers to lay the Army?s misfortunes at the door of our crippled Government, but the problem is more complex. Although the Army had considerable experience of counterinsurgency (and went on at unwise length about the fact), there is little sign that it applied its own doctrine in Iraq. There was palpable tension between the formal US-led chain of command from Baghdad and input from our own Joint Headquarters at Northwood.

Successive British divisional commanders in Basra (individually the stars of their generation) were in post for only six months, making it hard for them to grasp the changing nature of the conflict, and to build and maintain relationships with key Iraqi players. A British officer recently highlighted the difficulty of mentoring an Afghan colleague. ?He has been in post for about three years,? he told me, ?and I am something like the eighth mentor he has had.?

Within the military profession there is much debate as to whether Afghanistan is ?the war? ? the defining struggle of our times ? or ?a war?, to be followed by different sorts of struggle elsewhere, for which different techniques and equipment will be required. The discussion is wrapped round the axle of inter-Service politics, more than usually febrile as this cohort of single-Service chiefs departs in an air of budgetary gloom. If it is the war, then the Army needs more people to fight it, and it must change the way it does business. Quantity has a quality all of its own, and excessive recourse to long-range firepower (with all it means in that evasive phrase ?collateral damage?) is often a sign that one is losing the real battle.

?We need to win a war, not spin one,? argues the lawn-mowing author. We need a proper strategy, which will mean nothing if it is not explained to a sceptical electorate. And we need to remember that those folk on their second row of medal ribbons demand attention, perhaps by constructive dissent.

Farewell, Rupert. May the dust lie light upon you, and may we use your example to apply ourselves better. And if we cannot, then we should not risk the lives of more brave men like you.

Richard Holmes is Emeritus Professor of Military and Security Studies at Cranfield University and the author of Marlborough, Britain?s Greatest General

My take is that we need a real strategy, not a sequence of tactical ploys; winning battles will not necessarily win the war.

Confident assertions that the ?comprehensive approach?, a key plank of our doctrine (notable for its absence from Iraq), is in place must be matched by visible and accurate application of both money and talent, much of the latter by definition non-military.

However we need to remember the imperatives here and they have little to do with stabilising Afghanistan and more to do with geopolitical reality.

Which are that Afghanistan is a pivot for relations among regional actors, principally Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, India, and Pakistan.

The new US security presence in the region (because that is what we have now and it is increasing) is providing additional impetus toward a redefinition by those regional powers of their strategic interests vis-a-vis each other and the United States.

A presence in Afghanistan allows the US to have regional influence in Pakistan and Iran.

Central Asian republics also are pressure points for the US in its relation with Russia.

[Brendan]

I don?t think I?m alone in thinking that blowing half of Afghanistan to hell is not going to make my family and I safe from terrorist attacks. In fact it?s going to make us more vulnerable.

People don?t go blowing themselves up on tubes for fun but if you send soldiers halfway across the world to kill their people, interfere in their politics and threaten their way of life they suddenly find the motivation. Or at least radical groups are given the justification they need to attract followers.

The blood of innocent British people is already on the hands of this government and now they expect us to buy this kind of shit. They are criminal and nothing more.

And shame on the military too for their whole, ?ours is not to question why.? attitude. If they so eagerly require (or is it demand I can never tell) the unquestioning support of the public they need to reciprocate by using their power and influence to at least try to act in the best interest of the land and not just at the behest of the scum in charge.

[Santerme]

Unfortunately Brendan there are some suppositions in your argument which, with respect, are flawed.

The military act on behalf of the Govt.

The Armed Forces will advise if it can it be done, how they will do it, at what predicted cost and in a timeframe.

Policy is not and never should be our function, we merely facilitate.

As to the point on being in Afghanistan making the world safer.

This is, of course, unqualified bullshit.

AQ has successfully dispersed its operations around the world, to Indonesia and the Horn of Africa in particular.

I do not believe for one second remanining in AFG makes me more secure here in the UK, in fact 7/7 proves that beyond doubt.

The fact we have some hundreds of potential, identified threats being tracked by the Security Services also gives lie to the premise.

But remember, AQ existed prior to 9/11 and targetted US, Australian and British interests around the globe.

[mockney piers]

I'm all for helping Afghanistan normalise after forty years of suffering. It's not really our business but if the international community can cooperate and do good things that has to be a step in the right direction.

Reconstruction is clearly hard, but surely the number one factor is to get the politics right. Far too many Afghans feel that they have a stooge gov't placed there by the US (not entirely unjustified) and it's weak and worst of all it's corrupt.

Until the Afghans feel they have a genuine say in the running of the country and until a stable political process is there then nothing can be achieved. Worst of all it's a recruiting sargeant for the Taliban and this is driving the war. As you point out Santerme, they will come off militarily worse in any encounter, but every bomb dropped on a village, every civilian cUght in the crossfire will irreperably undermine the nation building.

As far as I can see the war is by definition self defeating, and noone seems to have a clue about how to proceed with the political process. Vietnam was the same, it was a political faliure, a total defeat once they put a military junta in power and the tragedy is so many died for another 7 years before the inevitable became fact.

I can't predict what will happen here, but if we genuinely care about the Afghans then settlement with the Taliban will happen and we may have to accept a form of government that is not exactly of our design. If it's about spheres of influence in energy rich central Asia then we have to accept indefinite military presence and the consequent casualties.

I just wish there could be some honesty in the debate, like yourself and Brendan I dont buy the security line bullshit.

[Michael Palaeologus]

The security argument seems to run:

"Domestic security is enhanced by our intervention in Afghanistan because Asians Muslims in Leeds are radicalised by our actions in bombing Afghan Muslims in and around somewhere called Sangit and as a result will blow themselves up on the London Tube and go to Afghanistan to shoot at our brave Boys who are enhacing our domestic security through our intervention in Afghanistan because ...."

Simples.

[Santerme]

I will never understand why people believe we need to export democracy to a region that has never shown any signs of needing or aspiring to such a system of governance.

If an unintended consequence of our presence is something of an improvement in the conditions for the Afghanis then that at least is a positive.

The largest recruiting sergeant for AQ is the prevailing conditions on the Arab street and the youth bulge which is providing the raw material.

[Brendan]

Thanks for your reply Santerme. My comments on the military are more my personal opinion than an argument. I realy do appreciate that it is not nor should it be the military?s role to get involved in policy.

I do feel though that the armed forces of any country should be aware that they act in the name of the people of that country. This means that if they want the support/respect of the people they have to at some level or to some degree act within the boundaries that the people of the country find acceptable.

If they don?t it leaves us asking where the military will draw the line in obeying orders. At bombing civilians? Genocide? We have already seen that international law can be ignored if you have the right countries backing you. Although the situation sounds extreme it could well happen and we the public may not have the time to vote people giving the orders out of office before the damage is done.

[Santerme]

All countries who have engaged in war since the Kellogg-Briand Pact, it can be argued, have done so illegally.

Since the Nuremburg Principles there have been quite specific guidelines on what is and is not acceptable on the battlefield.

The Hague Conventions predate Nuremburg by almost 40 years, yet this treaty failed to stop the use of gas in WW1.

British Military Law is very specific.

The British Military Manual on the Laws of War states:

The first principle of war is that the enemy's powers of resistance must be weakened and destroyed. The means that may be employed to inflict injury on him, and which include both force and stratagems, are not, however, unlimited. They are restricted by international conventions and declarations, and also by the customary rules of warfare. Moreover, there are the compelling dictates of humanity, morality, civilization and chivalry, which must not be disregarded.

The doctrines underlying the British Army's method of conducting land warfare are central to the laws of war, which are proportionality and minimum use of force necessary to achieve legitimate military goals.

I am certain from my experience that this has governed, governs and will continue to govern the approach the British military take to armed conflict.